Autonomous Weapon Systems, International Crises, and Anticipatory Self-Defense by Leys, Nathan
Note
Autonomous Weapon Systems, International
Crises, and Anticipatory Self-Defense
Nathan Leys†
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................377
II. AUTONOMOUSWEAPONS AND INTERNATIONAL CRISES.............................................................384
A. The Canadian Geese Problem: False Positives and Trust ...............................................386
B. Hell Hath No Fury Like a Tricked Robot: Spoofing and Behavioral Hacking ...............387
C. The “Flash Crash” Fear: Competing Algorithms and Catastrophic Interaction..............388
D. The “Battle of New Orleans” Problem: AWS and Disaggregated Command-and-
Control ............................................................................................................................389
III. ANTICIPATORY SELF-DEFENSE ANDAUTONOMOUSWEAPON SYSTEMS ....................................391
A. Evidentiary Burdens ........................................................................................................394
B. An Objective or Subjective Standard?.............................................................................394
C. AWS and Mistaken Self-Defense....................................................................................397
D. Self-Defense of What? AWS and Jus ad Bellum Proportionality ...................................400
E. AWS and “Armed Attack” ..............................................................................................402
IV. NEW “RULES OF THE ROAD”: HOW THE LAW SHOULD TREATAWS IN CRISIS SITUATIONS .....404
A. Swarming AWS and First-Blow Absorption...................................................................405
B. AWS and Command-and-Control ...................................................................................407
C. The “Orange Box” Rule ..................................................................................................409
V. CONCLUSION................................................................................................................................410
I. INTRODUCTION
On the twelfth day of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the senior officers of the
Soviet submarine B-59 faced a terrifying choice.1 Nearby U.S. warships had
begun dropping practice depth charges to force the submarine to surface, but the
Russian sailors—who had been unable to contact Soviet command for two
days—believed that the U.S. Navy was trying to kill them.2 For their part, the
Americans did not know that the B-59 was equipped with nuclear-tipped
torpedoes, nor that the sub had prior authorization to use their nukes without
direct permission from the Kremlin.3 Making matters worse, the submarine’s
crew was exhausted and dangerously overheated—temperatures in the
† The author graduated from Yale Law School in May 2020. Profuse thanks are due to Rebecca Crootof,
Paul Gewirtz, Rob Williams, and the talented editors of the Yale Journal of International Law.
1 The details of the October 27, 1962 incident are drawn from Svetlana V. Savranskaya, New Sources on
the Role of Soviet Submarines in the Cuban Missile Crisis, 28 J. STRAT. STUD. 233 (2005); Nicola Davis,
Soviet Submarine Officer Who Averted Nuclear War Honoured With Prize, GUARDIAN (Oct. 27, 2017),
https://www.theguardian.com/science/2017/oct/27/vasili-arkhipov-soviet-submarine-captain-who-
averted-nuclear-war-awarded-future-of-life-prize.html.
2 Savranskaya, supra note 1, at 245-49.
3 Davis, supra note 1.
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submarine had reached 45 degrees Celsius (113 degrees Fahrenheit).4 Amid the
stifling heat and the fear that World War III had already begun, the B-59’s
commanders had to decide whether to use their nuclear torpedoes in self-defense.
The sub’s second-in-command, Vasili Arkhipov, refused to give his consent
because he believed that the U.S. was not attacking the ship, and therefore that a
strike would not be justified as self-defense.5 Under Soviet military protocols,
his refusal meant the launch could not go forward.6 The Cuban Missile Crisis
ended the next day.
The events of October 27, 1962 highlight the importance of the legality
of using force in self-defense in the context of an international crisis. But what
if, instead of a handful of exhausted and terrified Soviet commanders, the
decision to strike was made by a computer chip? In the next generation of crises,
decisions such as these will be made by machines that think and act faster than
Vasili Arkhipov could blink. Artificial intelligence is enabling a new generation
of weapons that will dramatically change the nature of warfare.7 The most
capable—and notorious—of these are Autonomous Weapon Systems (“AWS”).
Once activated, AWS can select and engage targets without specific human
authorization.8 This onboard selection, targeting, and firing capability is what
distinguishes AWS frommore rudimentary robotic weapons systems, such as the
remotely piloted Predator drone; put differently, an autonomous weapon aims
itself and pulls its own trigger.
4 Savranskaya, supra note 1, at 246.
5 Id. at 247.
6 Davis, supra note 1.
7 See, e.g., PAUL SCHARRE, ARMY OFNONE: AUTONOMOUSWEAPONS AND THE FUTURE OFWAR 4
(2018) [hereinafter SCHARRE, ARMY OFNONE] (“Technology has brought us to a crucial threshold in
humanity’s relationship with war. In future wars, machines may make life-and-death engagement
decisions all on their own. Militaries around the globe are racing to deploy robots at sea, on the ground,
and in the air—more than ninety countries have drones patrolling the skies. These robots are
increasingly autonomous and many are armed.”).
8 The question of how to define AWS is almost as hotly debated as their legality. See, e.g., DEF. SCI.
BOARD, SUMMER STUDY ONAUTONOMY 21 (June 2016) (“[AWS] upon activation can select and
engage targets without human intervention.”); Rebecca Crootof, The Killer Robots Are Here: Legal and
Policy Implications, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1837, 1854 (2015) (defining an AWS as “a weapon system
that, based on conclusions derived from gathered information and preprogrammed constraints, is
capable of independently selecting and engaging targets.”) [hereinafter Crootof, Killer Robots]; Paul
Scharre, Autonomous Weapons and Operational Risk, CTR. NEWAM. SEC. 3 (2016),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS_Autonomous-weapons-operational-
risk.pdf?mtime=20160906080515 [hereinafter Scharre, Operational Risk] (contrasting AWS as
“weapons that would select and engage targets on their own” with “semi-autonomous weapons that
would retain a human ‘in the loop’ for selecting and engaging specific targets.”). See generallyMichael
Horowitz, Why Words Matter: The Real World Consequences of Defining Autonomous Weapon
Systems, 30 TEMPLE INT’L&COMP. L.J. 85, 86 (2016) (“A challenge in the attempt to understand the
ethical, legal, moral, strategic, and other issues associated with AWS is a basic lack of agreement over
what an autonomous weapon actually is.”). This overview is not intended to exhaust the definitional
debate, but to emphasize the common theme of AWS’ independence in selecting and engaging targets.
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An example may clarify what we mean when we say a weapon is
autonomous. Israel’s military has commissioned the Harpy drone to search for
and destroy enemy radars.9 Once activated, this unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)
“can find targets autonomously based on radar or radio wave emissions.”10 Once
the Harpy does so, it dive-bombs the radar installation, earning it the nickname
the “kamikaze drone.”11 Physically, the Harpy is really not that different from a
remote-controlled Predator drone. What makes the Harpies autonomous is their
“ability to complete the engagement cycle—searching for, deciding to engage,
and engaging targets—on their own.”12
Autonomous systems are increasingly common: estimates vary, but one
survey found over 280 weapons systems with some degree of autonomous
capability, in all shapes and sizes.13 Although the capabilities and deployment of
these systems vary widely, the trend is clear: a substantial number of life-or-
death decisions in the next generation of warfighting will be made by computers,
not humans.14 Nowhere are the stakes of these decisions higher than in an
international crisis, in which the wrong move can spark a full-blown war. But
although buckets of ink have been spilled over the implications of using AWS
under jus in bello (the law governing conduct during a war),15 remarkably little
attention has been paid to the legal implications of AWS for jus ad bellum (the
law of starting a war).16 The question of whether AWS in the midst of a war will,
for example, be able to adequately distinguish civilians from soldiers is
incredibly important, and answering that question may help save innocent lives.
But the best way to prevent collateral civilian casualties in a war is to prevent a
war. AWS may make difficult issues of jus ad bellum harder; they may, in some
cases, make them easier. But AWS will make jus ad bellum more complicated,
and the lack of attention to this issue now risks the later unthinking application
of pre-autonomy frameworks to a new reality when the stakes could not be
higher, with all the potentially lethal frictions that entails.
9 See generally SCHARRE, ARMY OFNONE, supra note 7, at 46-48; Tamir Eshel, Drones Turned Into
Weapons, AVIATIONWEEK (July 16, 2018), http://aviationweek.com/defense/drones-turned-
weapons.html.
10 Thomas Gibbons-Neff, Israeli-Made Kamikaze Drone Spotted in Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict,




12 SCHARRE, ARMY OFNONE, supra note 7, at 52.
13 Heather Roff, Weapons Autonomy is Rocketing, FOREIGN POL’Y (Sept. 28, 2016),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/09/28/weapons-autonomy-is-rocketing.html.
14 SCHARRE, ARMY OFNONE, supra note 7, at 1-7.
15 See infra notes 133, 137, 145 and accompanying text.
16 I have found just two papers that meaningfully address how AWS may intersect with questions of jus
ad bellum permissibility. See Ashley Deeks et al., Machine Learning, Artificial Intelligence, and the Use
of Force by States, 10 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 1 (2019); Heather M. Roff, Lethal Autonomous
Weapons and Jus Ad Bellum Proportionality, 47 CASEW. RES. J. INT’L L. 37 (2015) [hereinafter Roff,
Lethal Autonomous Weapons].
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The lack of attention to this issue does not only plague the
commentariat. For example, the position papers submitted by the United States,17
Russia,18 and China19 to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons’
Group of Government Experts (CCW-GGE), the primary intergovernmental
body addressing AWS, utterly fail to consider questions of jus ad bellum. So
does the U.S. Department of Defense’s seminal Directive 3000.09 on AWS.20
This is an astonishing blind spot that risks dangerous consequences.
This Note is among the first to examine the legal questions raised by the
use of force involving AWS during a crisis.21 I take “crisis” here to mean a period
of heightened tension between competing States, characterized by stepped-up
military activities, but before either side has launched an armed attack against
the other. Because the use of force outside the context of self-defense or UN
Security Council authorization is always illegal under international law,22 I ask
instead under what conditions should an AWS be permitted to use force in
anticipatory self-defense, and whether the actual or anticipated use of force by
an AWS alters the legality of another party’s self-defense.23 Although the
17 Submission from the United States to the Group of Governmental Experts of the High Contracting
Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons,
Which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects, U.N. Doc.
CCW/GGE.1/2017/WP.6 (Nov. 10, 2017)
https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/99487114803FA99EC12581D40065E90A/$fil
e/2017_GGEonLAWS_WP6_USA.pdf [hereinafter Submission from the United States].
18 Submission from the Russian Federation to the Group of Governmental Experts of the High
Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons Which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate
Effects, U.N. Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2018/WP.6 (Apr. 4, 2018),
https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/FC3CD73A32598111C1258266002F6172/$fil
e/CCW_GGE.1_2018_WP.6_E.pdf.
19 Submission from China to the Group of Governmental Experts of the High Contracting Parties to the
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which may be
Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects, U.N. Doc.
CCW/GGE.1/2018/WP.7 (Apr. 11, 2018),
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-
fora/ccw/2018/gge/documents/GGE.1-WP7.pdf. The Chinese position paper does argue that
“development and use of [AWS] would reduce the threshold of war, and the cost of warfare on the part
of the user countries. This would make it easier and more frequent for wars to break out,” but does not
touch the question of whether and how AWS would affect the legality of the onset of such conflicts. Id.
at 2.
20 U.S. DEP’T OFDEF. DIR. 3000.09, AUTONOMY INWEAPON SYSTEMS (Nov. 21, 2012) [hereinafter
DoDD 3000.09]. The closest DoDD 3000.09 comes to addressing jus ad bellum is its generic statement
that AWS must be employed “in accordance with the law of war,” id. at 3, and its warning of
“unintended engagements,” id. at 1, 9-11.
21 I use the formulation “involving AWS” because autonomous systems may be the actor, target, or
some combination of the two.
22 See infra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
23 There is, of course, substantial disagreement over whether the use of force in self-defense before
suffering an armed attack is ever legal. Compare YORAMDINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-
DEFENCE 200 (5th ed. 2011) (“Regardless of the shortcomings of the [UN Charter] system, the option of
a preventive use of force is excluded by Article 51.”) with THOMASM. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE:
STATEACTIONAGAINST THREATS ANDARMEDATTACKS 98 (2002) (“Has recourse to such anticipatory
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definitional boundaries of “anticipatory” self-defense are contested, I follow the
commonly acceptedCaroline standard: force may be used in self-defense “where
the need to respond is ‘instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means,
and no moment for deliberation.’”24 I argue that with the right rules, the
introduction of AWS into crises may improve compliance with jus ad bellum and
prevent unintended escalation.
Such an inquiry is overdue for two reasons. First, there is a real prospect
of an international crisis between the United States and a near-peer competitor
in the foreseeable future.25 AWS are likely to play an important role in such
situations. Paul Scharre, one of the key authors of the U.S. Department of
Defense’s foundational policy on AWS,26 argues that countries normally averse
to deploying AWS are more likely to do so in crises as a way to mitigate the risk
to their human soldiers in case of escalation.27 However, “[t]he result . . . could
be unintended escalation if the system engaged an otherwise legitimate enemy
target but in a situation where the human operator did not intend an engagement.
self-defense in circumstances of extreme necessity been preserved, or repealed, by the Charter?
Common sense, rather than textual literalism, is often the best guide to interpretation of international
legal norms . . . . [N]o law—and certainly not Article 51—should be interpreted to compel the reduction
ad absurdum that states invariably must await a first, perhaps decisive, military strike before using force
to protect themselves.”). As discussed below, this Note assumes the legality of anticipatory self-defense
in at least some circumstances. See infra notes 81-92 and accompanying text.
24 Ashley Deeks, Taming the Doctrine of Pre-Emption, in OXFORDHANDBOOK OF THEUSE OF FORCE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 662 n.5 (Marc Weller, ed., 2015) [hereinafter Deeks, Taming the Doctrine of Pre-
Emption] (quoting Letter from Daniel Webster, U.S. Secretary of State, to Lord Ashburton, British
Plenipotentiary (6 Aug. 1842), quoted in John Bassett Moore, A Digest of International Law, Vol. 2
(1906), § 217, at 412). This Note does not deal with cases in which the threat is less temporally
immediate and the legality of using force is more open to question, which Professor Deeks places under
the categories of “pre-emptive self-defense” and “preventive self-defense.” See also TALLINNMANUAL
2.0 ON INTERNATIONAL LAWAPPLICABLE TO CYBEROPERATIONS 350 (Michael N. Schmidt ed., 2d ed.
2017) [hereinafter TALLINNMANUAL] (arguing for adopting the Caroline standard in the context of
cyber armed attacks); see infra notes 84-87 and accompanying text (discussing the origins of the
Caroline standard and competing definitions of pre-attack self-defense).
25 See, e.g., Peter Baker et al., Seven Days in January: How Trump Pushed U.S. and Iran to the Brink of
War, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/11/us/politics/iran-trump.html;
Steven Lee Myers, American and Chinese Warships Narrowly Avoid High-Seas Collision, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/02/world/asia/china-us-warships-south-china-
sea.html (discussing tensions between the Chinese and U.S. navies in the South China Sea); Michael
Birnbaum & Paul Sonne, Trump’s Ambassador to NATO Sets Off Diplomatic Incident With a Nuclear
Edge, WASH. POST (Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/did-trumps-ambassador-to-
nato-threaten-russia-with-preemptive-strikes/2018/10/02/243c5ba2-c664-11e8-9c0f-
2ffaf6d422aa_story.html?utm_term=.1bfd23e38ef7 (“The U.S. ambassador to NATO set off alarm bells
Tuesday when she suggested that the United States might ‘take out’ Russian missiles that U.S. officials
say violate a landmark arms control treaty. . . . [A]rms control experts said [her comments] could be
interpreted to mean a preemptive strike. Such a move could lead to nuclear war.”). See generally Tim
Swejis et al., Back to the Brink: Escalation and Interstate Crisis, HAGUE CTR. STRATEGIC STUD. 7
(2016), https://hcss.nl/sites/default/files/files/reports/HCSS_StratMon_Back_to_the_Brink.pdf (“For
some time, many thought that interstate crisis was consigned to the dustbin of history. Even if it ever
was, the lid has certainly come off in recent years . . . . Rather than isolated incidents, these events mark
a larger trend: the comeback of interstate crisis.”).
26 DoDD 3000.09, supra note 20.
27 Scharre, Operational Risk, supra note 8, at 22.
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In a crisis, the consequences could be severe.”28At the risk of oversimplification,
it is impossible to know in advance how AWS will play a game of Chicken.29
The legal issues of an AWS-involved first strike are an important part of a
broader set of questions surrounding AWS and crisis decision-making.
Second, the legality of anticipatory strikes involving AWS will affect
whether and how a crisis escalates.30 There are three mechanisms by which this
may occur. First, lawyers play an underappreciated role in operational decision-
making.31 If an anticipatory strike by an AWS would be prohibited or legally
dubious, a professional military supplied with competent legal advice may
choose not to deploy or activate such systems. Second, supporters of AWS
contend that these systems may (eventually) be programmed to scrupulously
follow all applicable laws and rules.32Assuming the possibility of such a system,
an autonomous weapon’s capacity to evaluate the legality of an anticipatory
strike would be a crucial part of its programming. Third, whether an action is
legal will affect how it is perceived by the policymakers and publics of each
country involved in a crisis.33 Public perception, in turn, plays a major role in
28 Id.
29 SCHARRE, ARMY OFNONE, supra note 7, at 209 (“Even a robot programmed to shoot only in self-
defense could still end up firing in situations where humans wished it hadn’t. If another nation’s military
personnel or civilians were killed, it might be difficult to de-escalate tensions.”).
30 This may be true whether or not the legal question is ever presented to an adjudicative body whose
legitimacy and jurisdiction is generally accepted. See, Legal Argumentation in International Crises: The
Downing of Korean Air Lines Flight 007, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1198, 1209-11 (1984) (arguing that
international law shapes state behavior in crises even when there is no realistic possibility of sanctions
for violations of international law).
31 Rosa Brooks, a current Georgetown University Law Center professor and former Counselor to the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, has discussed the role of lawyers in military decision-making.
See ROSA BROOKS, HOW EVERYTHING BECAMEWAR AND THEMILITARY BECAME EVERYTHING:
TALES FROM THE PENTAGON 197-98 (2016) (“[The] U.S. military as a whole takes the laws of war very
seriously. . . . Military lawyers undertake a wide variety of tasks . . . . [They] help commanders
determine rules of engagement . . . and participate in real-time decision[-]making about targeting.”).
32 The primary advocate of this view is Ronald Arkin. See, e.g., RONALDARKIN, GOVERNING LETHAL
BEHAVIOR INAUTONOMOUS ROBOTS (2009); Ronald Arkin, Lethal Autonomous Systems and the Plight
of the Non-Combatant, 137 AISB Q. 1 (2013); Ronald Arkin, The Case for Ethical Autonomy in
Unmanned Systems, 9 J. MIL. ETHICS 332 (2010). The United States government adopted a similar view
in its 2018 paper submitted to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). See
Submission from the United States, supra note 17.
33 The January 2020 crisis in U.S.-Iranian relations is a case-in-point. Broadly speaking, arguments that
the strike on Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Major General Qasem Soleimani was not justified by
an imminent threat (or at least that the administration had failed to provide sufficient evidence of such a
threat) formed the backbone of opposition to the strike and to further escalation. Julian E. Barnes et al.,
Pressed for Details on Suleimani Strike, Trump Administration Gives Few, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/07/us/politics/trump-soleimani.html. At least in part as a result of the
Trump administration’s failure to gain widespread support for further escalation, see Nathaniel Rakich,
Americans Don’t Know What to Think About Trump’s Iran Strategy, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Jan. 10, 2020),
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/americans-dont-know-what-to-think-about-trumps-iran-strategy, the
United States did not respond in kind to a retaliatory missile strike on U.S. bases in Iraq that did not
result in casualties. See Iran Missile Attack: Did Tehran Intentionally Avoid U.S. Casualties? BBC (Jan.
8, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-51042156. Although it is impossible to know
exactly what causal role legalistic arguments about the propriety of the Suleimani strike played in de-
escalation, it seems clear that public perception of the legality of the strike was at least somewhat related
to the U.S. decision not to escalate to a full-blown war.
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whether a crisis escalates to war.34 A public that sees itself as the victim of
unlawful violence is more likely to be belligerent; a public that views its leaders’
decision to take the country to war as illegal is more likely to be pacifistic.
Despite the importance of the AWS-jus ad bellum connection, the
literature is worryingly silent on these issues. To be sure, the rise of AWS has
sparked heated legal debates. Generally speaking, these discussions fall into
three distinct but related categories. The first group of debates, following an
influential 2012 report by Human Rights Watch and the Harvard Law School
International Human Rights Clinic,35 asks whether and when the development,
deployment, and use of AWS could be permissible under the existing law of
armed conflict (LOAC) or international humanitarian law (IHL).36 The second
set of debates addresses whether and how existing international law should be
changed to address AWS, including the question of whether an international ban
on such systems should be adopted.37 The third category of legal debates
regarding AWS examines how to apportion blame and liability should an
autonomous weapon malfunction and/or harm noncombatants.38
34 Perhaps the best-known authority for this proposition is ROBERT JERVIS, PERCEPTION AND
MISPERCEPTION IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1976). See also James D. Fearon, Domestic Political
Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 577 (1994) (discussing
role of audience costs in crisis escalation) [hereinafter Fearon, Domestic Political Audiences]; James D.
Fearon, Rationalist Explanations for War, 49 INT’LORG. 379 (1995) (same) [hereinafter Fearon,
Rationalist Explanations].
35 Losing Humanity: The Case Against Killer Robots, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Nov. 19, 2012),
https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/11/19/losing-humanity/case-against-killer-robots.html.
36 See, e.g., Robert Sparrow, Twenty Seconds to Comply: Autonomous Weapon Systems and the
Recognition of Surrender, 91 INT’L L. STUD. 699 (2015); Gregory P. Noone & Diana C. Noone, The
Debate Over Autonomous Weapon Systems, 47 CASEW. RES. J. INT’L L. 25 (2015); Kenneth Anderson
& Matthew Waxman, Law and Ethics for Autonomous Weapon Systems: Why a Ban Won’t Work and
How the Laws of War Can, HOOVER INST. (2013)
https://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/Anderson-
Waxman_LawAndEthics_r2_FINAL.pdf; Michael N. Schmitt & Jeffrey S. Thurnher, “Out of the
Loop:” Autonomous Weapon Systems and the Law of Armed Conflict, 4 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 231
(2013); Tyler D. Evans, At War with the Robots: Autonomous Weapon Systems and the Martens Clause,
41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 697 (2013).
37 See, e.g., Mark Gubrud, Why Should We Ban Autonomous Weapons? To Survive, IEEE SPECTRUM
(June 1, 2016), https://spectrum.ieee.org/automaton/robotics/military-robots/why-should-we-ban-
autonomous-weapons-to-survive.html; Chris Jenks, False Rubicons, Moral Panic, & Conceptual Cul-
De-Sacs: Critiquing & Reframing the Call to Ban Lethal Autonomous Weapons, 44 PEPP. L. REV. 1
(2016); John Lewis, The Case for Regulating Fully Autonomous Weapons, 124 YALE L.J. 1309 (2015);
Anderson & Waxman, supra note 36.
38 See, e.g., Rebecca Crootof, War Torts: Accountability for Autonomous Weapons, 164 U. PA. L. REV.
1347 (2016) [hereinafter Crootof, War Torts]; Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Accountability and Autonomous
Weapons: Much Ado About Nothing, 30 TEMPLE INT’L&COMP. L.J. 63 (2016); Daniel N. Hammond,
Autonomous Weapons and the Problem of State Accountability, 15 CHI. J. INT’L L. 652 (2015); Tim
McFarland & Tim McCormack, Mind the Gap: Can Developers of Autonomous Weapon Systems be
Liable for War Crimes?, 90 INT’L L. STUD. 361 (2014); Mind the Gap: The Lack of Accountability for
Killer Robots, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 9, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/04/09/mind-
gap/lack-accountability-killer-robots.html.
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A smaller but growing literature is beginning to address the potential
strategic and political effects of AWS.39 Some focus on the empirics and theory
of domestic public opinion and AWS.40 Others have reported on the competitive
aspects of the race to develop AI-enabled weapons.41 Still others—including the
Author—have examined how the introduction of AWS might affect the
escalation of international crises and strategic stability.42 But amid this flurry of
commentary, the dog that has not yet barked is the legality of first strikes when
AWS are in the picture.
This Note proceeds in five parts. To highlight the stakes and illuminate
the remainder of the analysis, Part II examines how AWSmay affect how a crisis
unfolds, with an emphasis on scenarios in which an AWS strikes first. Part III
explores how AWS complicate the traditional jus ad bellum analysis. Part IV
proposes safeguards to prevent AWS from sparking an illegal war, for example
by requiring AWS, under certain circumstances, to absorb the first blow before
shooting back. Part IV also briefly addresses enforcement. Part V concludes.
II. AUTONOMOUSWEAPONS AND INTERNATIONALCRISES
Autonomous Weapon Systems will affect how and whether crises
escalate. This is especially true for the most dangerous kinds of crises, involving
two or more powerful and technologically advanced States. AWS capabilities
are concentrated among a handful of countries with advanced militaries,
39 See, e.g., Andrew Massie, Autonomy and the Future Force, 10 STRAT. STUD. Q. 134 (2016).
40 See, e.g., Michael Horowitz, Public Opinion and the Politics of the Killer Robots Debate, 3 RES. &
POL. 1 (2016); Frank Sauer & Niklas Schörnig, Killer Drones: The ‘Silver Bullet’ of Democratic
Warfare?, 43 SEC. DIALOGUE 363 (2012); Charli Carpenter, How Do Americans Feel About Fully
Autonomous Weapons?, DUCK OFMINERVA (June 19, 2013), http://duckofminerva.com/2013/06/how-
do-americans-feel-about-fully-autonomous-weapons.html.
41 The bulk of this literature focuses on the race between China and the United States to develop AWS.
See, e.g., Elsa B. Kania, Battlefield Singularity: Artificial Intelligence, Military Revolution, and China’s
Future Military Power, CTR. NEWAM. SEC. (2017), https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-
interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/CNAS-
Battlefield%20Singularity,%20Artifical%20intelligence,%20Military%20Revolution,%20and%20China
's%20Future%20Military%20Power.pdf; Tom Upchurch, How China Could Beat the West in the Deadly
Race for AI Weapons, WIRED (Aug. 8, 2018), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/artificial-intelligence-
weapons-warfare-project-maven-google-china.html; John Markoff & Matthew Rosenberg, China’s
Intelligent Weaponry Gets Smarter, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/03/technology/artificial-intelligence-china-united-states.html. I have
written elsewhere that the United States desperately needs a sophisticated comparative analysis of how
other countries view the role of AWS in their own and in the American militaries, similar to that of
Dima Adamsky’s famous comparative study of precision-guided munitions. Nathan Leys, Autonomous
Weapon Systems and International Crises, 12 STRAT. STUD. Q. 48, 67-68 n.76 (2018); DIMAADAMSKY,
THE CULTURE OFMILITARY INNOVATION: THE IMPACT OF CULTURAL FACTORS ON THE REVOLUTION IN
MILITARYAFFAIRS IN RUSSIA, THEUNITED STATES, AND ISRAEL (2010).
42 See, e.g., Leys, supra note 41; Jürgen Altmann & Frank Sauer, Autonomous Weapon Systems and
Strategic Stability, 59 SURVIVAL 117 (2017); Heather Roff, The Strategic Robot Problem: Lethal
Autonomous Weapons in War, 13 J. MIL. ETHICS 211 (2014).
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including the United States, China, Russia, Israel, the U.K., and so on.43
Although rudimentary autonomous capabilities may trickle down to less-
advanced countries, the most capable—and therefore dangerous—AWS are
likely to stay in the hands of those militaries between whom a war would be
especially devastating.44
Legal debates around anticipatory self-defense and strategic debates
over foreign policymaking in crises will draw on overlapping sets of facts. This
is because the same facts that constitute a crisis will often provide the basis for a
purportedly legal first strike. For example, troop movements near a disputed
border are a common characteristic of international crises.45 Those same troop
movements may provide the factual predicate for a strike in anticipatory self-
defense.46 Although a comprehensive treatment of the mechanisms by which
AWS might impact escalation between these countries is beyond the scope of
this Note, this section briefly discusses four problems using facts abstracted from
various real-life crises to illustrate some of the operational and legal
consequences of introducing AWS into a crisis. These include the problem of
false positives and trust in autonomous systems; spoofing and behavioral
hacking; “flash crashes” resulting from unpredictable interactions between
adversarial AWS that go south faster than humans can intervene; and AWS’
ability to continue fighting when command-and-control networks have been
damaged, but after hostilities have ceased.
43 See generally Vincent Boulanin & Maaike Verbruggen, Mapping the Development of Autonomy in
Weapon Systems, STOCKHOLM INT’L PEACE RES. INST. (2017),
https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2017-
11/siprireport_mapping_the_development_of_autonomy_in_weapon_systems_1117_1.pdf.
44 Cf. Andrea Gilli & Mauro Gilli, The Diffusion of Drone Warfare? Industrial, Organizational, and
Infrastructural Constraints,” 25 SECURITY STUD. 67 (2016) (arguing that the proliferation of state-of-
the-art unmanned vehicles has been less widespread and is more difficult than commonly assumed).
45 In just the past few years, troop movements near disputed borders have characterized crises in Ukraine
(seeMichael Kofman et al., Lessons from Russia’s Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, RAND
CORP. (2017), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1498.html), Gaza (see Anna Ahronheim,
IDF Beefs Up Troops in Gaza Border As Rioting Grows in the South, JERUSALEM POST (Oct. 4, 2018),
https://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/IDF-reinforces-southern-border-to-prevent-terror-from-
Gaza-568645.html), India-Pakistan (see Jeffrey Gettleman, Troops on the Move as India And Pakistan
Face Off Over Kashmir, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/25/world/asia/kashmir-india-pakistan-pulwama.html), and the
Korean Peninsula (see Choe Sang-Hun, North Korea Renews Guam Threat Ahead of Joint Naval
Exercise, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/13/world/asia/north-korea-
renews-guam-threat-ahead-of-joint-naval-exercise.html).
46 See, e.g., Miriam Sapiro, Iraq: The Shifting Sands of Preemptive Self-Defense, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 599,
601 (2003) (“In 1967, Israel launched an attack on the Egyptian army massing on its borders . . . . [T]his
action is frequently cited as the classic modern case of legitimate anticipatory self-defense.”). One
scholar has noted that Israel initially attempted to characterize its strike as “an act of self-defense taken
in response to an Egyptian attack” that had already begun, rather than as an act of anticipatory self-
defense. David A. Sadoff, A Question of Determinacy: The Legal Status of Anticipatory Self-Defense, 40
GEO. J. INT’L L. 523, 567 (2009).
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A. The Canadian Geese Problem: False Positives and Trust
The AI-driven increase in the tempo of battle means that soldiers will
be under intense time pressure to either authorize action or stand down when
faced with an autonomous system’s (possibly incorrect) warning of an incoming
attack. In the mid-1950s, a U.S. early warning system picked up what it believed
to be a Soviet missile launch. Fortunately for the United States, the “projectile”
turned out to be a flock of geese. Fortunately for the U.S.S.R., someone in the
U.S. chain-of-command apparently had the presence of mind not to press the
proverbial red button. In the waning days of the Cold War, Mikhael “Gorbachev
kept a sculpture of a goose in his Moscow office,” a reminder of the danger of
placing too much trust in a computer’s interpretation of a crisis.47
But a soldier presented with a warning of an inbound attack today may
have no choice but to trust her computer. “Just as autonomy is needed to
successfully defend against saturation attacks from missiles and rockets today, it
similarly might be needed in other future [combat] situations where human
reaction times are too slow to be successful.”48 For example, putting a sailor in
charge of manning a warship’s defenses may doom the whole crew if there are
too many missiles moving too quickly for a human to shoot down—but putting
a computer in charge of the anti-missile system may save the ship. And as AWS
(and AI generally) advance, that soldier may become predisposed to “automation
bias,” in which “people presume that algorithmic decisions are made on the basis
of indisputable hard science, or operate at a level beyond human capacity, or . .
. [they] fear overruling the computer and ‘getting it wrong.’”49 Compounding
this phenomenon, militaries may endeavor to increase their soldiers’ trust in
AWS in an effort to improve the effectiveness of human-robot teams.50
A soldier’s trust in an AWS, born of necessity and training, may be
desirable in many—even most—cases. But when an AWS does not require
human authorization to engage, when events move so quickly that a soldier does
not have the chance to perform a threat analysis separate from the machine’s and
is forced to defer to the computer, or when a soldier trusts a machine more than
she trusts her own judgment, false alarms can have disastrous consequences. The
47 DAVID E. HOFFMAN, THEDEADHAND: THEUNTOLD STORY OF THE COLDWARARMS RACE AND ITS
DANGEROUS LEGACY 475 (2009).
48 Scharre, Operational Risk, supra note 8, at 46.
49 Deeks et al., supra note 16, at 18.
50 Heather M. Roff & David Danks, “Trust but Verify”: The Difficulty of Trusting Autonomous Weapon
Systems, 17 J. MIL. ETHICS 2 (2018).
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Patriot fratricide debacle during the Iraq War is illustrative.51 During the 2003
invasion of Iraq, the United States employed the Patriot missile-defense system
to shoot down Iraqi Scud missiles. But on three different occasions, Patriot
batteries mistook U.S. or British jets for hostile targets. In its autopsy of the
friendly fire incidents, the DOD’s Defense Science Board concluded that “the
Patriot system . . . [was] a poor match to the conditions of [Operation Iraqi
Freedom]. The operating protocol was largely automatic, and the operators were
trained to trust the system’s software.”52 Imagine if, during a crisis but before the
outbreak of violence, a missile-defense battery operating near a disputed border
mistook a rival’s routine air patrol (or a flock of Canadian geese) for an incoming
missile. Systems like the Patriot do not only risk friendly-fire in a war; they also
risk starting one.
B. Hell Hath No Fury Like a Tricked Robot: Spoofing and
Behavioral Hacking
A second problem created or exacerbated by introducing AWS into
crises is that of spoofing or behavioral hacking. These terms describe an
adversary’s efforts to trigger an undesirable reaction from an artificially
intelligent system.53 This is similar to the Canadian Geese problem, except the
false positive is fed to the AWS by an adversary or third party. In the context of
anticipatory strikes by AWS, this could involve an adversary or third party
feeding an autonomous weapon information designed to cause the AWS to fire
first.
Recall the Harpy, Israel’s anti-radar “kamikaze drone.” The IDF’s
perennial adversaries, Palestinian militant groups like Hamas, “have been using
human shields, hospitals, schools, UN facilities, mosques, hotels and private
homes to hide and protect personnel and equipment since the late 1960s.”54 In
the 2014 Gaza conflict, Hamas fired rockets from these locations “to provoke
51 A 60 Minutes exposé on the fratricides explained, “if the Patriot displays the symbol for an incoming
ballistic missile, its operator has just seconds to decide whether to override the machine, or let it fire.”
Rebecca Leung, The Patriot Flawed? Failure to Correct Problems Led to Friendly Fire Deaths, 60
MINUTES (Feb. 19, 2004), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-patriot-flawed-19-02-2004.
52 Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Patriot System Performance: Report Summary,
OFF. UNDER SEC’YDEF. ACQUISITION, TECH. & LOGISTICS 2 (2005),
https://dsb.cto.mil/reports/2000s/ADA435837.pdf.
53 Paul Scharre, The Lethal Autonomous Weapons Governmental Meeting (Part I: Coping with Rapid
Technological Change), JUST SECURITY (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/46889/lethal-
autonomous-weapons-governmental-meeting-part-i-coping-rapid-technological-change.html (“Deep
neural networks . . . have shown a particular vulnerability to a form of spoofing attack where the
machine is fed false data to manipulate its decision-making. . . . [T]hese spoofing attacks can be hidden
so that they are invisible to humans, and there is currently no known effective defense against this form
of attack.”).
54 Eitan Shamir & Eado Hecht, Gaza 2014: Israel’s Attrition vs Hamas’ Exhaustion, 44 PARAMETERS
81, 85 (2014).
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retaliatory fire.”55 It is entirely conceivable that rather than firing rockets from a
school, which may strengthen the legitimacy of a self-defense claim by Israel,
Hamas could instead place a targeting radar on top of the same school and
“spoof” a Harpy into firing the first shot.
C. The “Flash Crash” Fear: Competing Algorithms and
Catastrophic Interaction
The interaction of two adversarial Autonomous Weapon Systems in a
tense but non-violent situation poses the risk of unintentional escalation at
dizzying speeds, otherwise known as a “flash crash”. Although such a scenario
is not known to have occurred at the time of writing, other examples of negative
interactions between competitive, algorithm-based systems do not provide much
reason for comfort. For instance, “automated stock trading algorithms offer an
example of the risks of autonomous systems interacting in complex, competitive
environments and at speeds exceeding human reaction times.”56 In 2010,
competing algorithms set off a “flash crash” that wiped out around 10 percent of
the Dow Jones Industrial Average in a matter of minutes.57 Outside the stock
market context, two competing buy-sell algorithms on Amazon bid the price of
an obscure textbook on flies up to $23.7 million dollars (plus $3.99 shipping).58
The fear is that two militaries’ AWS will interact in a way that creates a rapid
feedback loop with destructive consequence.59
The risk of unforeseeable adversarial interaction is exacerbated by the
possibility that an AWSmay act to achieve its goals in a way that humans cannot
predict or understand. The experience of AlphaGo is instructive.60 Go is an
ancient and incredibly complex game of strategy. In 2017, an AI called AlphaGo,
which had been trained on sets of expert human games, defeated the world’s top
human Go player. Later, DeepMind—a research offshoot of Google and the
creator of AlphaGo—released recordings of a new AI, AlphaGo Zero, which had
been trained only by playing itself.61 The self-trained program defeated the
human-trained AI, 100-0.62 Go experts described AlphaGo Zero’s strategies as
55 Id.
56 Scharre, Operational Risk, supra note 8, at 35.
57 Id.
58 Olivia Solon, How A Book About Flies Came to Be Priced $24 Million On Amazon, WIRED (Apr. 27,
2011), https://www.wired.com/2011/04/amazon-flies-24-million/.
59 Ulrike Esther Franke, Flash Wars: Where Could An Autonomous Weapons Revolution Lead Us?,
EUR. COUNCIL FOREIGN REL. (Nov. 22, 2018),
https://www.ecfr.eu/article/Flash_Wars_Where_could_an_autonomous_weapons_revolution_lead_us
(“With [AWS], ‘flash crashes’ could turn into ‘flash wars’.”).
60 See Leys, supra note 41, at 53.
61 David Silver et al., Mastering the Game of Go Without Human Knowledge, 550 NATURE 354, 354
(2017).
62 Id.
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“moments of algorithmic inspiration,” “previously unknown,” and
“creativ[e].”63 As the DeepMind researchers write, training AIs on human
strategies “may impose a ceiling on… performance.”64 But training AIs to break
that ceiling may make the AI’s actions incomprehensible to humans. Assuming
that comprehensibility and performance are at least somewhat inversely related
and that no two countries’ AWS will be trained in exactly the same way,65 it is
hard to know how human soldiers will interpret an AWS’s actions. And it is
harder still to predict how those actions will be interpreted by an adversarial
AWS.
D. The “Battle of New Orleans” Problem: AWS and
Disaggregated Command-and-Control 66
AWS’ ability to fight when disconnected from their handlers is both a
feature and a bug, at least when hostilities were once ongoing but have since
ceased. Conceptually, this problem is not new. On January 8, 1815, British forces
attacked American troops under the command of Andrew Jackson during the
Battle of New Orleans.67 The clash occurred during peacetime; unbeknownst to
the combatants, the United States and the United Kingdom had already signed
the Treaty of Ghent, ending the War of 1812.68 Of course, Andrew Jackson did
not have access to a satellite phone.69 The last two centuries have seen dramatic
63 Larry Greenemeir, AI versus AI: Self-Taught AlphaGo Zero Vanquishes Its Predecessor, SCI. AM.
(Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/ai-versus-ai-self-taught-alphago-zero-
vanquishes-its-predecessor.
64 Silver et al., supra note 61, at 354.
65 Scharre, Operational Risk, supra note 8, at 36 (“[C]ompetitors are not likely to share their algorithms
with one another.”).
66 Professor Rebecca Crootof has helpfully pointed out to me that this phenomenon might be more
accurately described as a problem for jus post bellum (which roughly translates as “the law of ending
war”) rather than jus ad bellum. See generally Carsten Stahn, Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the
Discipline(s), 23 AM. U. INT’L L. REV.311 (2008); Carsten Stahn, ‘Jus Ad Bellum’, ‘Jus In Bello’ . . .
‘Jus Post Bellum’? – Rethinking the Conception of the Law of Armed Force, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 921
(2006). To the extent that jus post bellum is a legal concept with independent force (rather than a
philosophical outgrowth of just war theory), it has largely been developed in the context of a major
power’s and the international community’s responsibilities to the people of an occupied state after the
defenestration of the latter’s government. See, e.g., Dana Wolf, Transitional Post-Occupation
Obligations Under the Law of Belligerent Occupation, 27 MINN. J. INT’L L. 5 (2018). Where AWS have
a post-war policing role, I agree that a discussion of jus post bellum and autonomy is important. Cf.
Christof Heyns, Human Rights and the Use of Autonomous Weapons Systems (AWS) During Domestic
Law Enforcement, 38 HUM. RTS. Q. 350 (2016). Such a discussion is, of course, beyond the scope of this
Note. In my view, jus post bellum as it has been developed in the last two decades has little applicability
to a situation in which a military-to-military clash breaks a ceasefire between two states of comparable
power and ignites a new conflict; jus ad bellum governs the recourse to force when hostilities are not
occurring, regardless of whether hostilities have occurred in the recent past, and therefore governs here.
67 Abraham D. Sofaer, Emergency Power and the Hero of New Orleans, 2 CARDOZO L. REV. 233, 240
(1980).
68 Id. at 241.
69 A similar situation (strategically speaking) confronted the Japanese holdouts, or Zanryū Nipponhei,
Japanese Imperial soldiers stationed on remote Pacific islands who were unaware (or did not believe)
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improvements in the “command-and-control” (C2) structures on which modern
military commanders rely to collect information from, and relay orders to, troops
in the field. But the modern communications networks on which the United
States, its allies, and its peer/near-peer competitors rely may well be targeted
early on in a conflict.70 AWS will be especially valuable in degraded C2
environments; unlike Predator drones, for example, their ability to fight does not
depend on the quality or even existence of a satellite uplink to an Air Force base
in Nevada.71 In addition, autonomy may reduce the risk of hacking72 and the
strain on C2 networks even in the best of times.73
DARPA’s Collaborative Operations in Denied Environments (CODE)
program illustrates concretely how AWS might function when they cannot
contact their human operators.74 CODE’s purpose is “to design sophisticated
software that will allow groups of drones to work in closely coordinated teams,
even in places where the enemy has been able to deny American forces access
to GPS and other satellite-based communications.”75 Although CODE’s purpose
is not explicitly to develop fully autonomous weapons, it does seek to leverage
autonomy to reduce the need for direct human control of unmanned systems.76
The strategic and technical goals of CODE are a short step from realizing AWS
that can function in denied environments.77
that WWII had ended. See, e.g., Justin McCurry, Hiroo Onoda: Japanese Soldier Who Took Three
Decades to Surrender, Dies, GUARDIAN (Jan. 17, 2014),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/17/hiroo-onoda-japanese-soldier-dies. See also Leys,
supra note 41, at 58, 66 (discussing the example of the Zanryū Nipponhei).
70 See, e.g., Andrew Massie, Autonomy and the Future Force, 10 STRAT. STUD. Q. 134, 146 (2016) (“If
the adversaries we expect to face take the battlefield, the long screw driver will be consigned to history .
. . .”); James Dobbins, War With China, 54 SURVIVAL 7, 15 (2012) (“Chinese cyber and anti-satellite
capabilities may in time be able to disrupt US C4ISR [command, control, communications, computers,
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] capabilities . . . .”).
71 SeeW.J. Hennigan, Drone Pilots Go to War in the Nevada Desert, Staring at Video Screens, L.A.
TIMES (June 17, 2015), https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-drone-pilots-20150617-story.html.
72 On the risk of an AWS being hacked, seeMichal Klincewicz, Autonomous Weapon Systems, the
Frame Problem and Computer Security, 14 J. MIL. ETHICS 162 (2015).
73 Daniel Gonzales & Sarah Harting, Designing Unmanned Systems with Greater Autonomy: Using a
Federated, Partially Open Systems Architecture Approach, RAND CORP. (2014) at xii,
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR600/RR626/RAND_RR626.pdf
(“[A]utonomous functions [may] reduce messaging loads on communications links to C2 and
information analysis centers. For example, autonomous onboard planning algorithms can help reduce
communications loads and lessen the need for frequent maneuver, heading, or flight commands.”).
74 See generally Scott Wierzbanowski, Collaborative Operations in Denied Environment (CODE), DEF.
ADVANCED RES. PROJECTSAGENCY, https://www.darpa.mil/program/collaborative-operations-in-
denied-environment (last visited May 21, 2020). CODE is not the only U.S. program seeking to realize
the military benefits of AI-enabled systems. See Boulanin & Verbruggen, supra note 43, at 94-97.
75 Kelsey D. Atherton, Are Killer Robots the Future of War? Parsing the Facts on Autonomous
Weapons, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/15/magazine/autonomous-
robots-weapons.html.
76 Id.
77 See, e.g., Jamie Condliffe, A 100-Drone Swarm, Dropped from Jets, Plans Its Own Moves, MIT
TECH. REV. (Jan. 10, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/2017/01/10/154651/a-100-drone-
swarm-dropped-from-jets-plans-its-own-moves/ (discussing successful DOD testing of a supervised
autonomous UAV swarming concept).
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Now imagine if an AWS, severed from its C2 network by accident,
attack, or design,78 were forced to decide whether to engage a nearby target.79
For example, MK 60 CAPTOR (encapsulated torpedo) mines “detect and
classify submarines and release a modified torpedo” to attack enemy targets.80 If
such an autonomous torpedo launcher, stationed in a crucial shipping lane during
a conflict and cut off from C2 before the declaration of a ceasefire, picked up an
adversary’s warship bearing down on it, such a weapon might—like Andrew
Jackson’s forces at New Orleans—decide to attack under the mistaken
assumption that hostilities were ongoing. Such an attack might well scuttle peace
talks and erase the credibility of one party’s promise to hold its fire.
III. ANTICIPATORY SELF-DEFENSE AND AUTONOMOUS WEAPON
SYSTEMS
Under the U.N. Charter, a State may legally use force in only two
scenarios: self-defense and pursuant to authorization by the U.N. Security
Council.81 This Note deals with the former, as the collective security provisions
of the U.N. Charter are effectively defunct.82 Furthermore, it is difficult to
imagine how the use of AWS in a Security Council-authorized action would
78 See, e.g., Jeremy Straub, Consideration of the Use of Autonomous, Non-Recallable Unmanned
Vehicles and Programs as a Deterrent or Threat by State Actors and Others, 44 TECH. SOC. 39 (2016).
79 One might also draw a comparison to the crew of the nuclear submarine USS Alabama in the 1995
film Crimson Tide. The Alabama receives an order to launch its nuclear missiles against a Russian
military base fueling its ICBMs, but before launching begins to receive another message from U.S.
Strategic Command. The second message is interrupted in dramatic fashion by the attack of a Russian
submarine, and after defeating the Russian sub the Alabama’s captain and second-in-command must
decide whether to continue with the launch or hold off until contact with Strategic Command can be
reestablished. Needless to say, the film concludes with Denzel Washington saving humanity. CRIMSON
TIDE (Hollywood Pictures 1995).
80 MK 60 Encapsulated Torpedo (CAPTOR), GLOBAL SEC.,
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/mk60.htm. See also Scott C. Truver, Naval
Mines and Mining: Innovating in the Face of Benign Neglect, CTR. INT’LMARITIME SEC. (Dec. 20,
2016), http://cimsec.org/naval-mines-mining-innovating-face-benign-neglect/30165 (discussing the
potential role of next-generation naval mines in the Third Offset).
81 U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”); U.N. Charter art. 42 (discussing use of force
pursuant to Security Council authorization); U.N. Charter art. 51 (“Nothing in the present Charter shall
impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nations . . . .”).
82 As Professor Franck pointed out nearly half a century ago, “[a]lmost from the moment the San
Francisco Charter was signed, [the] essential prerequisite for U.N. collective enforcement action—the
unanimity of the great Powers [on the Security Council]—was seen to be an illusion. . . . As Chapter VII
[collective security] was seen to rust, increasing use began to be made of Articles 51, 52, and 53, which
set out the rights of states” to self-defense. Thomas M. Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)? or: Changing
Norms Governing the Use of Force by States, 64 AM. J. INT’L L. 809, 810-11 (1970); see also David
Kaye, Adjudicating Self-Defense, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 134, 148 (2005) (“The UN Charter,
with the Security Council as its enforcer, was drafted on the premise that the UN’s collective security
machinery would work. But since that has often not been the case, reliance by states on self-defense has
been the norm. . . . [S]elf-defense is not the exceptional right imagined by some; it is a typical way in
which states enforce security.”).
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render an otherwise permissible use of force unlawful under the jus ad bellum
inquiry. This Note does not address whether an autonomous system could legally
use force in self-defense once a conflict has begun, an inquiry that belongs under
jus in bello.
This Note instead asks how the introduction of AWS changes the
inquiry into when States may lawfully make the transition between peace and
war, or, put differently, between crisis and violence. Specifically, under what
conditions may AWS use force in anticipatory self-defense?
Much ink has been spilled over whether anticipatory strikes can ever be
legal under international law, a question which generally turns on how a given
author defines “anticipatory” self-defense.83As noted above, I follow the modern
consensus in defining anticipatory self-defense in line with the Caroline
Doctrine, which permits the use of force when the party claiming anticipatory
self-defense can “show a necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming,
leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.”84 Professor Deeks
distinguishes this from “preemptive self-defense,” meaning “the use of force in
self-defence to halt a particular tangible course of action that the potential victim
State perceives will shortly evolve into an armed attack against it,” and
“preventive self-defense,” meaning “the use of force in self-defence to halt a
serious threat of an armed attack, without clarity about when or where that attack
may emerge.”85 For these latter two categories, in which the threat of armed
attack is less temporally immediate, the validity of claims of self-defense is
generally acknowledged to be weaker, which is why I do not address them here.86
The applicability of the Caroline standard to the brave new world of
AWS finds support in the law of nuclear weapons. Speed, rather than destructive
potential, distinguishes both nuclear weapons and AWS from other conventional
weapons. In its 1996 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of
83 See generally Sean D. Murphy, The Doctrine of Preemptive Self-Defense, 50 VILL. L. REV. 699
(2005). See also DINSTEIN, supra note 23, at 204-05 (arguing that the U.N. Charter forecloses claims of
self-defense that are “conjectural” in any measure, but allows for “interceptive” self-defense when an
enemy has “committed itself to an armed attack in an ostensibly irrevocable way.”); FRANCK, supra
note 23, at 107 (asserting that “States seem willing to accept strong evidence of the imminence of an
overpowering attack as tantamount to the attack itself, allowing a demonstrably threatened state to
respond under Article 51 as if the attack had already occurred, or at least to treat such circumstances,
when demonstrated, as mitigating the system’s judgment of the threatened state’s pre-emptive
response.”).
84 See supra note 2 and accompanying text; Deeks, Taming the Doctrine of Pre-Emption, supra note 24.
See alsoMichael Wood, The Caroline Incident, in THEUSE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: A
CASE-BASEDAPPROACH 5-14 (Tom Ruys et al. eds., 2018); James A. Green, Docking the Caroline:
Understanding the Relevance of the Formula in Contemporary Customary International Law
Concerning Self-Defense, 14 CARDOZO J. INT’L&COMP. L. 429 (2006).
85 Deeks, Taming the Doctrine of Pre-Emption, supra note 24, at 662-63.
86 Id.
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Nuclear Weapons, the ICJ suggested that the use of nuclear weapons in
anticipatory self-defense may be permissible “in an extreme circumstance of
self-defence, in which [a State’s] very survival would be at stake.”87 But as
Thomas Schelling famously noted, even with the advent of the nuclear weapons,
“[i]t is not true that for the first time in history man has the capability to destroy
a large fraction, even the major part, of the human race. . . . Against defenseless
people there is not much that nuclear weapons can do that cannot be done with
an ice pick.”88 The fundamental contribution of nuclear weapons “is not in the
number of people they can eventually kill but in the speed with which it can be
done. . . . [N]uclear weapons make it possible to compress the fury of global war
into a few hours.”89 AWS provide a similar contribution, greatly accelerating the
tempo of battle.90Of course, the prototypical AWS—e.g., a close-in ship defense
system like the U.S. Navy’s Phalanx CIWS or a swarm of small, expendable
drones—is far less destructive than a nuclear weapon. But because speed is what
distinguishes nuclear weapons, the logic of the 1996 Advisory Opinion translates
rather well to AWS.
Resolving the question of whether anticipatory self-defense can ever be
legal lies well beyond the scope of this Note. This Note, like most experts and
the U.S. foreign policy establishment,91 assumes that anticipatory strikes that
move a situation from crisis to violence are legal when they meet the Caroline
standard (or something close to it).92 But the mechanical application of static jus
ad bellum principles to AWS produces certain tensions and may even lead to
unwanted escalation. In this Part, I present five legal friction points of AWS-
involved anticipatory strikes: the evidentiary burden a State must meet to make
out a claim of self-defense under international law; whether the standard for
evaluating a State’s self-defense claim is objective, subjective, or some
combination of the two; the question of mistaken self-defense; the requirement
of jus ad bellum proportionality (as distinct from its jus in bello counterpart); and
the issue of whether and when an AWS’s use of force qualifies as an “armed
attack” giving rise to a right of self-defense.
87 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 97 (July 8).
88 THOMAS SCHELLING, ARMS AND INFLUENCE 19 (1966).
89 Id. at 20-21 (emphasis in original).
90 Paul Scharre, A Million Mistakes a Second, FOREIGN POL’Y (Sept. 12, 2018),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/12/a-million-mistakes-a-second-future-of-war/.
91 See, e.g., AIDENWARREN& INGVILD BODE, PREVENTIVE AND PREEMPTIVE SELF-DEFENSE INUS
NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY: A BRIEFHISTORY 46-59 (2014) (arguing that U.S. foreign policy has
long contemplated anticipatory self-defense); Anthony Clark Arend, International Law and the
Preemptive Use of Military Force, 26 WASH. Q. 89 (2003) (arguing that anticipatory self-defense “does
not violate international law because the [U.N.] charter framework is no longer reflected in state
practice” and therefore is no longer good law.).
92 See also Deeks, Taming the Doctrine of Pre-Emption, supra note 24, at 662 (describing anticipatory
self-defense as the “least-controversial form of pre-attack self-defense . . . The view that a state must
wait to suffer an armed attack before being able to respond forcibly now appears to be a minority
view.”).
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A. Evidentiary Burdens
A self-defense claim requires factual support. The introduction of AWS
will make the collection and presentation of the evidence of an armed attack
giving rise to a right to self-defense easier in some cases, but harder in others.
As the ICJ reiterated in the Oil Platforms case, “the burden of proof of the facts
showing the existence of such an attack [justifying the use of force in self-
defense] rests on the” party claiming self-defense.93 In many—perhaps most—
cases, AWS will not make this task more difficult than it already was. Indeed, if
AWS are equipped with sensor capabilities beyond that of a human, their
recordings of events may even make it easier for a State to prove its self-defense
claim after the fact.94
In the case of expendable AWS that are not in constant contact with a
command system, however, claims of self-defense may be all-but-impossible to
prove. Take so-called “fire and forget” missiles, like the UK’s Brimstone missile
or the aforementioned Israeli Harpy drone. These weapons need not
communicate with a centralized command structure and are valuable because
they are “relatively inexpensive . . . and expendable.”95 Consider again the
spoofing example of a Hamas radar installation placed on top of a school.
Normally, if a pilot detects a target-lock by an enemy missile, the pilot may pull
the trigger first in a justifiable use of self-defense because an “an armed attack
[against the pilot] may be deemed to be in progress.”96 But if an Israeli Harpy
detects a Hamas radar lock and decides to strike, and the data recorded by the
drone have not also been recorded by some other Israeli unit, all the data that the
drone used to make that decision will be destroyed in the subsequent dive-
bombing. Israel would find it impossible to meet its burden of proof, because the
act of striking would destroy the evidence necessary to justify the strike.
B. An Objective or Subjective Standard?
The Caroline standard is straightforward enough, but on its own does
not answer the question: instant and overwhelming need according to whom? To
justify its use of force against State Z, State X has the burden of proof to show
93 Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, ¶ 57 (Nov. 6) [hereinafter Oil
Platforms].
94 But cf. Caren Myers Morrison, Body Camera Obscura: The Semiotics of Police Video, 54 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 791 (2017) (critiquing notion that real-time recordings of violent interactions can provide
objective evidence of what occurred).
95 John Markoff, Fearing Bombs That Can Pick Whom to Kill, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/12/science/weapons-directed-by-robots-not-humans-raise-ethical-
questions.html.
96 DINSTEIN, supra note 23, at 203.
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that its use of force was in self-defense.97 A purely objective standard would ask
only whether State Z had actually launched an armed attack, ignoring what State
X did, or should, have believed. A purely subjective standard would ask only
whether State X believed an attack was underway, or perhaps would defer
entirely to whatever State X says its subjective belief was.98 A mixed approach
might ask whether Actor State X’s actual subjective belief that an attack was
underway was objectively reasonable.99 Generally speaking, the standard for
adjudicating self-defense claims is predominantly objective. As the ICJ held in
Oil Platforms, “the requirement of international law that measures taken
avowedly in self-defence must have been necessary for that purpose is strict and
objective, leaving no room for any ‘measure of discretion.’”100 However, some
scholars have argued that various elements of the self-defense inquiry—
including the threshold question of whether an “armed attack” has occurred—
leave some room for subjectivity, at least for now.101
The introduction of AWS into crisis situations should and likely will
hasten the move towards objectivity in the adjudication of self-defense claims.
The reason is simple: the difficulties intrinsic to subjective analysis of artificially
intelligent decision-making make an objective standard far more attractive.
Commentators have explored in detail the problem of the “black box” in artificial
intelligence, the notion that “[i]t may be impossible to tell how an AI that has
internalized massive amounts of data is making its decisions.”102 Consider the
black box problem in the context of two hypothetical post-hoc evaluations of an
anticipatory strike, one involving a human soldier and the other involving an
AWS. The human soldier can be interviewed to determine if she shot first
because she thought she saw an enemy aiming a gun at her, or if her gun
discharged accidentally, or if she received faulty Rules of Engagement, and so
97 Oil Platforms, supra note 93, at ¶ 57.
98 See generally David Kaye, supra note 82, at 149-52 (discussing subjectivity and objectivity in self-
defense claims).
99 For a discussion of the doctrinal history of the tension between objectivity and subjectivity in
determining state responsibility, see David K. Linnan, Iran Air Flight 655 and Beyond: Free Passage,
Mistaken Self-Defense, and State Responsibility, 16 YALE J. INT’L L. 245, 354-66 (1991).
100 Oil Platforms, supra note 93, at 196. See also Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities
Against Nicaragua, Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶282 (June 27) (“[W]hether a measure is necessary to
protect the essential security interests of a party is not . . . purely a question for the subjective judgment
of the party: the text does not refer to what the party ‘considers necessary’ for that purpose.”)
[hereinafter Nicaragua].
101 David Kaye, supra note 82, at 149-52; Norman G. Printer, The Use of Force Against Non-State
Actors Under International Law: An Analysis of the U.S. Predator Strike in Yemen, 8 UCLA J. INT’L L.
& FOREIGNAFF. 331, 338-39 (2003) (“[T]he determination of whether an aggressive use of force
crosses the threshold [contemplated by Article 51 of the U.N. Charter] and triggers the exercise of self-
help is a subjective one to be made by the attacked state. Nonetheless, the determination is ultimately
subject to legal scrutiny by the international community in conformity with the preceding standard.”).
102 Yavar Bathaee, The Artificial Intelligence Black Box and the Failure of Intent and Causation, 31
HARV. J. L. & TECH. 889, 891 (2018). See also Davide Castelvecchi, Can We Open the Black Box of
AI?, NATURE (Oct. 5, 2016), https://www.nature.com/news/can-we-open-the-black-box-of-ai-1.20731
(describing the black box problem).
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on. But humans have not figured out how to get a sophisticated AI to tell us
precisely how and why it made a given decision in a way that is both
comprehensible and comprehensive.103 Given the difficulty, bordering on
impossibility, of asking an AWS about its subjective mindset at the time it
launched an anticipatory strike, an objective standard provides the only
manageable mode of inquiry.
This prediction, if correct, suggests more accountability for violations
of international law. First, shifting to a purely objective standard would simplify
adjudication. Rather than delving into actors’ mindsets amidst the fog of war, an
adjudicator will need only analyze whether the threat of armed attack was
actually so “instant” and “overwhelming” that it left “no choice of means, and
no moment for deliberation.”104 This simplification means that an actor’s
perceptions of a threat are no longer a justification for its actions; concomitantly,
one would expect that a lower proportion of actors claiming self-defense could
do so effectively.
Second, because the party claiming self-defense bears the burden of
establishing the factual basis for that claim, a purely objective standard would
incentivize that party to design and operate AWS to maximize the amount of
data recorded about the event, i.e., to create a ‘paper trail’ to show the lawfulness
of their actions. More information about an alleged use of self-defense, in turn,
provides the opportunity for more transparency. An analogy familiar to anyone
with a basic understanding of how consumer laptops work may be helpful: RAM
(random access memory) is to an AWS’ data analysis as a hard drive is to an
AWS’ collection and preservation of its own thought processes and
observational data. My argument is that the de-emphasis on what happens in an
AWS’ RAM and the increased emphasis on what is stored in its hard drive will
make it easier for investigators and adjudicators to discern exactly what
happened, and thus who (if anyone) violated what laws.105
One exception to the foregoing may be found in the post-hoc analysis
of human decisions made with the help, or at the recommendation, of artificially
intelligent battle-management systems. As Ashley Deeks, Noam Lubell, and
Daragh Murray point out, autonomous systems will not only alter the battlespace
103 SeeWill Knight, The Dark Secret at the Heart of AI, MIT TECH. REV. (Apr. 11, 2017),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/604087/the-dark-secret-at-the-heart-of-ai/; Cliff Kuang, Can A.I.
Be Taught to Explain Itself?, N.Y. TIMES. MAG. (Nov. 21, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/21/magazine/can-ai-be-taught-to-explain-itself.html.
104 See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
105 I use the RAM and hard-drive analogy only to illustrate the distinction between the analysis of data
and the collection and storage of data. Of course, the system architecture of an AWS may be far more
complex than the traditional RAM/hard-drive distinction.
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as weapons platforms, but also as artificially intelligent systems integrated into
C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance).106 This coheres with the U.S. DOD Defense
Science Board’s systems-level approach, which conceives of autonomy as “the
explicit allocation of cognitive functions and responsibilities between the human
and computer to achieve specific capabilities.”107When the unit of analysis is a
combined human-AI decisionmaker, some post-hoc subjective inquiry into how
and why the relevant humans made decisions with support from an artificially
intelligent battle-management system may be appropriate. The contours of such
an inquiry, of course, would depend on the situation and command system in
question.
C. AWS and Mistaken Self-Defense
AWS raise the possibility that computer glitches amid the fog of war
will result in tragedy. TheU.S.S. Vincennes is a cautionary tale. In 1988, the crew
of the Vincennesmade a horrible error, shooting down an Iranian civilian airliner
over the Persian Gulf that the crew of the Vincennes—based on the reports of the
ship’s computerized Aegis defense system—believed to be a military aircraft.108
Other mistakes involving computer-enabled weapons systems have also resulted
in “friendly fire” casualties, such as the Patriot incidents described in Section
II.A. As humans increasingly rely on computer-generated assessments of
whether an armed attack is underway, and especially when time pressures force
human soldiers “out of the loop” in determining a response,109 the probability
that an AWS will mistakenly shoot when it should have held its fire will rise
dramatically. Stephanie Carvin puts this in terms of Charles Perrow’s classic
Normal Accident Theory, arguing that AWS are “tightly coupled, highly
interactive complex systems” and consequently, “accidents will inevitably
occur.”110 In the context of a tense standoff, such a mistake could result in what
the DOD’s Directive on Autonomy in Weapons Systems euphemistically terms
an “unintended engagement.”111
106 Deeks et al., supra note 16, at 6 (“The proliferation of machine learning might prompt political and
military officials to . . . rely more heavily on detailed machine learning risk assessments when deciding
whether and how to use force.”).
107 Task Force Report: The Role of Autonomy in DoD Systems, OFF. UNDER SECRETARYDEF.
ACQUISITION, TECH. & LOGISTICS (July 2012) at 4, https://fas.org/irp/agency/dod/dsb/autonomy.pdf.
108 Linnan, supra note 99, at 246-47.
109 For a discussion of AWS and Boyd’s OODA (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act) “loop,” see generally
Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 36.
110 Stephanie Carvin, Normal Autonomous Accidents: What Happens When Killer Robots Fail? (Mar. 1,
2017) (unpublished manuscript) at 3, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3161446.
111 DoDD 3000.09, supra note 20, at 15 (defining an “unintended engagement” as “[t]he use of force
resulting in damage to persons or objects that human operators did not intend to be the targets of U.S.
military operations, including unacceptable levels of collateral damage beyond those consistent with the
law of war, ROE, and commander’s intent.”).
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Normally, a claim of mistaken but reasonable self-defense is no claim
of self-defense at all. As the ICJ held in its Nicaragua decision, the use of force
in self-defense must be “proportional to the armed attack and necessary to
respond to it.”112A shot fired in self-defense cannot be “necessary to respond to”
an armed attack if no armed attack has occurred.113 As David Linnan
persuasively argues, the notion of a “mistaken self-defense” justification for the
use of force under international law finds scant precedential or scholarly
support.114 Thus, a State deploying AWS in a crisis can expect to be held
responsible if and when a “Normal Accident” occurs in which its autonomous
weapon system fires in mistaken self-defense.
Two factors may alter this analysis. First, as I have argued elsewhere,
States that wish to avoid both conflict and the audience costs of allowing a
perceived transgression to go unpunished may prefer, as an off-ramp, to blame a
use of force on a technical glitch.115 In a recent real-world example, President
Trump suggested that Iran had mistakenly shot down a U.S. drone, attributing
the use of force to a rogue “loose and stupid” military commander.116 As a
legalistic corollary, States may prefer to resolve such incidents through what
Rebecca Crootof has termed “war torts.”117 Professor Crootof argues that
international tort law could solve the “accountability gap” that emerges when an
AWS commits an atrocity that cannot qualify as a war crime because an
autonomous system cannot possess intention or be legally reckless.118 Under her
proposal, a State whose AWS used force in mistaken self-defense would owe
compensation but would not need accept moral blameworthiness.119 Applying
Crootof’s remedy-based framework to the narrow class of illegal uses of force
when an AWS (allegedly) fires in mistaken self-defense may also serve as a sort
of “emergency release valve,” reducing the domestic audience costs of de-
escalation and allowing leaders to avoid further conflict.120
112 Nicaragua, supra note 100, ¶176.
113 An action must be objectively necessary for self-defense; an actor’s beliefs, reasonable or not, are
irrelevant. See supra notes 95-105 and accompanying text.
114 Linnan, supra note 99.
115 Leys, supra note 41, at 60-61. The theoretical basis for this claim is James Fearon’s model of crisis
escalation. At risk of oversimplification, Fearon posits that because “side payments” to resolve a dispute
are almost always possible, choosing war is irrational. The answer to the paradox of why wars
nevertheless occur is that policymakers view the domestic audience costs of de-escalation as
outweighing the expected costs of war. See Fearon, Rationalist Explanations, supra note 34; Fearon,
Domestic Political Audiences, supra note 34.
116 Demetri Sevastopulo et al., Trump Says ‘Hard to Believe’ Downing of U.S. Drone Was Intentional,
FIN. TIMES (June 20, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/8d41d4a2-930e-11e9-aea1-2b1d33ac3271.html.
117 Crootof, War Torts, supra note 38.
118 Id. at 1353.
119 Id. at 1389-94.
120 Using claims of mistake as an off-ramp may deescalate crises even when the initial strike was not a
mistake. For example, India and Pakistan have long used “untruths . . . [as] a much-needed off-ramp for
dampening tensions” amid border disputes. C. Christine Fair, India’s and Pakistan’s Lies Thwarted a
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Second, the liability of a State for mistaken self-defense is intrinsically
related to the attributability of the use of force to that State. The doctrine of state
responsibility’s legal fiction of attribution makes sense when a human soldier
makes the mistake; after all, “[s]tates act through human beings.”121 But the
fiction that “l’état, c’est un robot” may become untenable as States increasingly
rely on AWS. For example, some have raised the possibility of products liability
for AWS’ violations of international law, implying that the violation is more
readily attributable to the manufacturer or designer, rather than the State.122
Hacking or spoofing may also place an AWS’s actions outside any meaningful
sense of control or commander’s intent.123 Compounding these problems,
militaries employing AWS may wish to keep the scope of authority granted to
autonomous systems opaque for obvious strategic reasons—making it all but
impossible to determine if an AWS’ allegedly ultra vires act is incidental to the
empowered capacity (in which case the action is attributable to the State) or if
the AWS’ act falls outside the grant of authority (in which case the action is not
attributable to the State).124
So, if an AWS fires first in a crisis, a state may argue that it did not
violate jus ad bellum. Not because the AWS (and thus the State) acted in
justifiable—but mistaken—self-defense, but because the autonomous system’s
actions cannot be attributed to the State at all. Therefore, the argument goes, the
State did not violate the international legal prohibition on the use of force,
because the State qua State did not use force. Whether this view is correct or not,
the point is that it would be in a State’s interest to so argue. This creates a tension
with the widely held view under jus in bello of commander responsibility for
their AWS.125 If States can advance their interests and avoid dangerous
escalation by arguing that they are not responsible for the alleged errors of their
War—For Now, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 8, 2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/03/india-pakistan-kargil-kashmir/584392/. By
misinforming their respective electorates, India and Pakistan reduced the domestic audience costs of de-
escalation, potentially averting a war between nuclear-armed states. See Fearon, Domestic Political
Audiences, supra note 34.
121 Linnan, supra note 99, at 364.
122 PATRICK LIN ET AL., AUTONOMOUSMILITARY ROBOTICS: RISK, ETHICS, ANDDESIGN 56-57 (2008),
https://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=phil_fac.pdf. But see
Daniel N. Hammond, Autonomous Weapons and the Problem of State Accountability, 15 CHI. J. INT’L L.
652, 665-67 (2015) (criticizing calls for programmer or products liability); Losing Humanity: The Case
Against Killer Robots, supra note 35, at 43-44 (same). See generally Tim McFarland & Tim
McCormack, Mind the Gap: Can Developers of Autonomous Weapon Systems be Liable for War
Crimes?, 90 INT’L L. STUD. 361 (2014).
123 See, e.g., Scharre, Operational Risk, supra note 8, at 38-39 (“Adversaries would have strong
incentives to hack such [autonomous] systems, either directly through malware or via behavioral
hacking . . . .”).
124 TALLINNMANUAL, supra note 24, at 90-91 (addressing this concept in the context of cyberattacks).
125 See, e.g., Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Accountability and Autonomous Weapons: Much Ado About
Nothing, 30 TEMPLE INT’L&COMP. L.J. 63, 70 (2016) (“In truth, it is not complicated to find command
accountability for directing the use of any weapon without a reasonable belief that doing so would
comply with the law of war.”).
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AWS under jus ad bellum, then what becomes of state responsibility for
atrocities committed by AWS under jus in bello?
D. Self-Defense of What? AWS and Jus ad Bellum Proportionality
AWS may throw a wrench into conventional evaluations of jus ad
bellum proportionality (a distinct concept from its jus in bello counterpart).
Under established jus ad bellum principles, force used in self-defense must be
proportionate to the force used in the armed attack giving rise to the right of self-
defense.126Heather Roff, in one of the few articles to address AWS through a jus
ad bellum lens, argues that a State employing AWS in a defensive posture can
never satisfy this proportionality requirement.127 She argues that because AWS
cannot die, the State deploying them will be less likely to terminate hostilities
than if it relied on human soldiers.128 The primary legal weakness of Roff’s
analysis is that it relies on a philosophical—rather than legalistic—approach to
jus ad bellum proportionality. Her framework “weigh[s] only the relevant goods
of waging war,” that is, preventing the completion or recurrence of a single,
aggressive use of force, “against all of the foreseen evils of doing so,” including
every foreseeable harm resulting from escalation.129 This conception of
proportionality is out-of-step with accepted legal understandings of jus ad bellum
proportionality, which is confined to comparing “the quantum of [aggressive]
force and [defensive] counter-force used, as well as the casualties and damage
sustained.”130 “There is no support in the practice of States for the notion that
[jus ad bellum] proportionality remains relevant—and has to be constantly
assessed—throughout the hostilities in the course of war.”131 Thus, bracketing
whether Roff is correct from a philosophical point of view, her argument is not
legally persuasive.
Despite the legal weaknesses in Roff’s analysis, she does make one
point that illuminates an interesting problem of AWS and jus ad bellum
proportionality. Roff argues that if one confines the proportionality analysis to a
given engagement between AWS not involving humans—say, two autonomous
UAVs dogfighting far from any human-occupied aircraft—“one would have to
126 See, e.g., Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (D.R.C. v. Uga.),
Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶147 (“[T]he taking of airports and towns many hundreds of kilometres from
Uganda’s border would not seem proportionate to the series of transborder attacks it claimed had given
rise to the right of self-defence, nor to be necessary to that end.”).
127 Roff, Lethal Autonomous Weapons, supra note 16, at 37.
128 Id. at 37-38.
129 Id. at 41.
130 DINSTEIN, supra note 23, at 262.
131 Id.
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rely on arguments concerning property damage.”132 The framing of AWS as
property—or, in the terms of the laws of war, materiel—raises the question of
whether an attack on an autonomous weapon renders lawful the same defensive
use of force as would a similar attack on a human.133 After all, if States deploy
AWS in part because robots are not shipped home in flag-draped coffins,134 the
implication is that States (rightly) view the destruction of AWS as less serious
than the killing of human soldiers. Therefore, if an AWS detects an incoming
attack that threatens itself but not any nearby humans, and determines that
returning fire would endanger enemy humans, the principle of jus ad bellum
proportionality as currently understood may require the autonomous system to
hold its fire.
Not all experts may agree on this point. The Tallinn Manual 2.0, for
example, assumes without explanation that an attack on “property or persons”
may qualify as an “armed attack” within the meaning of Article 51.135 The logic
appears to be based on the Law of Armed Conflict’s well-established rule that
military materiel is a legitimate target during armed conflicts.136 But that rule
falls under the rubric of jus in bello, and may not mechanically translate to the
domain of jus ad bellum where the rules of proportionality are generally
stricter.137 I do not expect the question of whether an attack on non-human
property (i.e., an AWS) can qualify as an armed attack to be settled by this Note.
I intend rather to make the point that already-difficult questions of
132 Roff, Lethal Autonomous Weapons, supra note 16, at 45. Roff goes on to argue that because
“common law and US jurisprudence prohibit using lethal force in defense of property,” damage to AWS
cannot satisfy the proportionality requirement of jus ad bellum. Id. This argument fails to recognize that
the laws of armed conflict are fundamentally different from domestic criminal law. For example, the
laws of war permit killing by mistake (assuming the killer tried their best to minimize collateral
damage). Domestic law does not. More obviously, U.S. criminal law would not govern a military
conflict between, say, Luxembourg and Micronesia.
133 Both enemy materiel and enemy combatants are considered lawful targets under jus in bello. See
Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 36, at 246-47 (2013) (discussing AWS’ ability to distinguish between
lawful targets (combatants and military objects) and unlawful targets (noncombatants and civilian
objects)).
134 For a discussion of the political dynamics of states’ decisions to deploy AWS, see, e.g., Frank Sauer
& Niklas Schörnig, Killer Drones: The ‘Silver Bullet’ of Democratic Warfare?, 43 SEC. DIALOGUE 363
(2012).
135 TALLINNMANUAL, supra note 124, at 346 (emphasis added). But see id. at 340 (arguing that non-
kinetic attacks may constitute armed attacks “because the ensuing consequences can include serious
suffering or death,” which may imply that an attack which could not cause bodily harm would not
trigger a right to self-defense under Article 51).
136 See Yoram Dinstein, Legitimate Military Objectives Under Current Jus in Bello, 78 INT’L L. STUDIES
139, 146-47 (2002).
137 See, e.g., Robert D. Sloane, The Cost of Conflation: Preserving the Dualism of Jus ad Bellum and Jus
in Bello in the Contemporary Law of War, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 47, 52-53 (2009) (“Briefly, ad bellum
proportionality asks whether the initial resort to force or particular quantum of force used is proportional
to the asserted casus belli. . . . In bello proportionality tries to limit needless suffering in war regardless
of the ad bellum legitimacy . . . . It asks whether each particular strike will cause civilian harm that
‘would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.’” (citation
omitted)).
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proportionality become even more important in the strategic and domestic
political context of autonomous weapons.
E. AWS and “Armed Attack”
The previous section dealt with attacks on AWS; this section deals with
the mirrored question of attacks byAWS. If the AWS of State X use force against
State Z without the proximate involvement of human commanders of State X,
then under existing ICJ precedent State Z may not have any legal right to self-
defense, anticipatory or otherwise.138 This is because the right to self-defense
under the UN Charter arises only “if an armed attack occurs.”139 Under ICJ
precedent, it is not entirely clear that sending non-human soldiers to inflict harm
on an adversary constitutes “an armed attack.” In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ
held that “an armed attack . . . includ[es] not merely action by regular armed
forces across an international border, but also ‘the sending by or on behalf of a
State of armed bands, groups, irregulars, or mercenaries.’”140 In other words,
attacks by humans acting on behalf of a State count, whether or not they are
incorporated into the aggressive State’s formal military command structure. But
“while the concept of an armed attack includes the despatch by one State of
armed bands into the territory of another State, the supply of arms and other
support to such bands cannot be equated with armed attack.”141 Per Nicaragua,
“the provision of weapons or logistical or other support” does not rise to the level
of an “armed attack” within the meaning of Article 51.142 The Nicaragua
judgment’s juxtaposition of sending human fighters on the one hand, and sending
weapons or military materiel on the other, raises the question of whether AWS
count as soldiers/armed bands or weapons.143 This question is easily disposed of
when the offensive use of an AWS is the result of a human operator’s command:
if a soldier of State X tells an AWS to shoot down planes of State Z, it would be
138 Note that this particular scenario does not necessarily involve an autonomous weapon using force in
anticipatory self-defense; the introduction of AWS changes questions of self-defense on both sides of
the equation.
139 U.N. Charter, art. 51.
140 Nicaragua, supra note 100, ¶195 (citation omitted).
141 Id. at ¶247. Cf.Michael J. Glennon, The Fog of Law: Self-Defense, Inherence, and Incoherence in
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, 25 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 539, 541 (2002) (“Providing
weapons and logistical support to terrorists does not constitute an ‘armed attack’.”).
142 Nicaragua, supra note 100, ¶195.
143 The ICJ’s holding in Nicaragua could be read to mean that the provision of weapons cannot give rise
to a right to self-defense because it is not sufficiently attributable to the allegedly belligerent state. This
has been referred to as the “‘rationae personae’ aspect [of Nicaragua] – that is, from whom the attack
emanates.” Abdulqawi A. Yusuf, The Notion of ‘Armed Attack’ in the Nicaragua Judgment and Its
Influence on Subsequent Case Law, 25 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 461, 462 (2012). But Nicaragua’s definition
of “armed attack” also encompasses what Judge Yusuf refers to as “the rationae materiae aspect of the
concept,” defining the level of force which constitutes an armed attack. Id. at 461. It is this latter notion
which is applicable here.
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absurd to suggest that the delegation of targeting and firing functions renders
such an action not an “armed attack.”
But the question is harder when the use of force in question is not the
direct result of human intention. The ICJ has suggested repeatedly that naval
mines, for example, do not rise to the level of armed attack.144 Obviously, there
are important distinctions between a naval mine and a truly autonomous weapon
system. The ICJ, however, has not drawn a clear distinction based on the degree
of autonomy possessed by the attacking unit; rather, its distinction appears to rest
on whether the attacking State sends humans or weapons to cause damage.
For purposes of the jus ad bellum inquiry, international courts and
policymakers could certainly reverse course and assimilate AWS into the former
category, such that their offensive use could constitute an “armed attack.” But
this would seem incoherent with international efforts to ban or regulate AWS as
weapons, in the vein of blinding lasers, landmines, or chemical weapons.145 If
AWS are “weapons” for the purposes of International Humanitarian Law (which
falls under the jus in bello umbrella), then shouldn’t they also be “weapons” for
the purposes of jus ad bellum? Thus, in the case of an offensive action taken by
State X’s AWS not at the direct command of State X’s human commander, it is
not clear that State Z has any right to use force in self-defense.
The assertion that damage caused by an AWS cannot amount to an
armed attack giving rise to a right of self-defense may cause some justifiable
skepticism. And, of course, the ICJ or other adjudicators may not apply the
Nicaragua distinction between soldiers and materiel so rigidly. There are at least
two paths to square this particular circle. First, an adjudicating bodymight decide
144 Oil Platforms, supra note 93, ¶72 (“The question is therefore whether [the mining of the U.S.S.
Samuel B. Roberts] sufficed in itself to justify action in self-defence, as amounting to an ‘armed attack’.
The Court does not exclude the possibility that the mining of a single military vessel might be sufficient
to bring into play the ‘inherent right of self-defence’; but in view of all the circumstances . . . the Court
is unable to hold that the [U.S. uses of force] have been shown to have been justifiably made in response
to an ‘armed attack on the United States by Iran, in the form of the mining of the USS Samuel B.
Roberts.”); The Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 35 (“The United Kingdom
. . . has classified ‘Operation Retail’ [entering Albanian waters for the purposes of clearing mines]
among methods of self-protection or self-help [following the destruction of two UK ships]. The Court
cannot accept this defense . . . .”).
145 See, e.g., John Lewis, The Case for Regulating Fully Autonomous Weapons, 124 YALE L.J. 1309
(2015) (arguing that international regulation of landmines provides a model for regulating AWS);
Crootof, Killer Robots, supra note 8, at 1883-90 (evaluating calls to ban AWS through the lens of other
weapon prohibition efforts). Rebecca Crootof has argued persuasively that whether policymakers and
adjudicators classify AWS as weapons, combatants, or something in between will determine the answer
to many important jus in bello questions; my argument is simply that the same may be true in the jus ad
bellum context of determining whether an “armed attack” has occurred. Rebecca Crootof, Autonomous
Weapon Systems and the Limits of Analogy, 9 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 51, 55 (2018) (“[T]he weapon and
combatant analogies for Autonomous Weapon Systems are at odds with each other, insofar as they
implicate distinct regulatory regimes. . . . Given this distinction, selecting the weapon or combatant
analogy will predetermine the answers to many troubling legal questions . . . .”).
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to revisit Nicaragua’s admittedly ambiguous language, recasting its
soldier/materiel distinction as really being about the level of damage rather than
the type of incursion. Second, an adjudicating body may follow the example of
the Claims Commission in Ethiopia v. Eritrea. There, the Commission held that
“[l]ocalized border encounters between small infantry units, even those
involving the loss of life, do not constitute an armed attack for purposes of the
Charter.”146 Framing at least low-level attacks by AWS without proximate
human involvement as something akin to “localized border encounters,” giving
rise to state responsibility but not a right to self-defense, is a plausible and
potentially escalation-dampening legal rule.147
IV. NEW “RULES OF THE ROAD”: HOW THE LAW SHOULD TREATAWS
INCRISIS SITUATIONS
The introduction of AWS into crisis situations will present new legal
and strategic challenges. The prior sections sought to illuminate those
difficulties; we now turn to what new rules might address these issues.
I do not here deal with enforcement in great detail. The question of how
to make sure these rules are followed is of course of great importance, but
analytically separate from this analysis. One would hope that because escalation
to conflict is a uniquely costly way of resolving disputes, States would adopt
rules that reduce the risk of escalation out of pure self-interest. I view this as the
best possible enforcement mechanism, because if a State truly believes that
deployment and use of AWS in violation of the following rules is in its own
interest, there is only so much weight that outrage from the International
Committee of the Red Cross and condemnation from a weapons review panel
will carry.148
To reduce the twin risks of escalation and violations of international
law, militaries should consider imposing a set of operational and programmatic
constraints on AWS in crisis situations. The first of these safeguards would
require AWS in swarming configurations to absorb the first blow before
retaliating, unless doing so would endanger human life. The second and third
relate to AWS’ strategic awareness: a “jus ad bellum switch” and an “auto-off”
feature. The fourth proposes an “orange box” rule to ensure the preservation of
data regarding the decision to strike. These rules would improve compliance with
146 Eri.-Eth. Claims Comm’n, Partial Award: Jus Ad Bellum – Ethiopia’s Claims 1-8, XXVI R.I.A.A.
457, ¶11 (Dec. 19, 2005).
147 But see Christine Gray, The Eritrea/Ethiopia Claims Commission Oversteps Its Boundaries: A
Partial Award?, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 699 (2006) (criticizing the above-referenced decision).
148 See Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 36, at 271-76 (2013) (discussing weapons review obligations
under international law with respect to AWS).
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international law, dampen escalation, reduce the chance of illegal wars, and save
lives.
A. Swarming AWS and First-Blow Absorption
In some circumstances, swarming Autonomous Weapon Systems
should be required to absorb the first blow before firing back. AWS will enter
the battlefield in networked swarms.149 For example, the U.S. military has tested
a swarm of around one hundred small winged UAVs called “Perdix” drones,
which are released from the back of a fighter jet and then coordinate with each
other to accomplish their objective.150 In addition to improving AWS’ lethality
and offensive capabilities, “swarm resiliency” will replace “[p]latform
survivability.”151 That is, the ability of a swarm of AWS to lose a fraction of its
members and continue functioning as a collective will become more important
than the ability of a single unmanned system to survive an attack. As Paul
Scharre notes, “[i]ndividual platforms need not be survivable if there are
sufficient numbers of them such that the whole is resilient against attack.”152 He
continues, swarming “allows the graceful degradation of combat power as
individual platforms are attrited, as opposed to a sharp loss in combat power if a
single, more exquisite platform is lost.”153 In other words, for an AWS swarm,
the cost of absorbing the first blow may be quite low. So too is the moral (and
political) cost, relative to an attack on a group of human soldiers—an AWS
cannot, in Thomas Schelling’s words, “die heroically, dramatically, and in a
manner that guarantees that the action cannot stop there.”154
Swarming AWS should be programmed not to fire in anticipatory self-
defense unless it is necessary to protect human life. Imagine a swarm of
autonomous UAVs patrolling a disputed border. The swarm discerns that the
radar of a surface-to-air missile has locked on to them and calculates that an
incoming missile will destroy between 5-10 percent of its UAVs. Under the
proposed rule, the UAVs may take evasive action, but may not fire on the missile
or the launch site until the missile has actually detonated. Or imagine that the
UAVs detect a child pointing what appears to be an RPG at them. One would
149 Chris Jenks, The Gathering Swarm: The Path to Increasingly Autonomous Weapon Systems, 57
JURIMETRICS 341, 351-55 (2017).
150 Jamie Condliffe, A 100-Drone Swarm, Dropped from Jets, Plans Its Own Moves, MIT TECH. REV.
(Jan. 10, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/603337/a-100-drone-swarm-dropped-from-jets-
plans-its-own-moves.html.





154 THOMAS SCHELLING, ARMS AND INFLUENCE 47 (1966).
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not expect a human pilot to wait to be fired on in the first scenario, and the second
presents a horrifying ethical conundrum. But for a swarm of AWS, neither
situation presents a choice between taking a life or risking your own.
Forcing a swarm of AWS to absorb the first blow may marginally
degrade combat ability, but the strategic and legal benefits of such a rule are clear
and dramatically outweigh the costs. Strategically, requiring State X to suffer
actual losses before returning fire reduces the escalatory possibility of an
“unintended engagement” in which State X fires the first shot.155 Legally, such
a rule would ameliorate the evidentiary issues addressed in Section III.A,
because evidence of an actual attack on a swarm of AWS would help circumvent
the “black box” issue.156 It would also reduce the risk of an AWS firing in
mistaken anticipatory self-defense, as considered in Section III.C. And it would
simplify the proportionality analysis discussed in Section III.D by allowing an
AWS to calibrate its response based on an actual battle-damage assessment,
rather than a probabilistic projection of an incoming attack’s potential impact.157
Finally, the period between the detection of an incoming attack and the
completion of that attack will allow more time for “meaningful human control,”
which may alleviate certain jus in bello concerns beyond the scope of this
Note.158
The proposed rule includes an important exception: AWS detecting an
incoming attack should be allowed to fire in anticipatory self-defense when the
attack threatens human life. As argued in Section III.D, if an attack threatens
both AWS and humans (as opposed to merely AWS), then the principle of
proportionality would permit greater force to be used. The same goes for the
necessity principle. Assuming that the attacker presents an ongoing threat to
human life (e.g., an artillery battery preparing to fire on a populated area),
anticipatory or “interceptive”159 self-defense may be necessary to protect those
lives, whereas a threat only against AWS may not necessitate the same level of
counterforce. This exception, and the accompanying proportionality and
necessity analyses, follow directly from the observation that robots are worth
155 DoDD 3000.09, supra note 20, at 15.
156 See Bathaee, supra note 102.
157 See DINSTEIN, supra note 23, at 262 (arguing that the jus ad bellum proportionality analysis requires
comparing “the quantum of force and counter-force used, as well as the casualties and damage
sustained.” (emphasis added)); Deeks et al., supra note 16, at 10 (discussing the use of autonomous
systems to inform proportionality and necessity analyses).
158 See generallyMichael C. Horowitz & Paul Scharre, Meaningful Human Control in Weapon Systems:
A Primer, CTR. NEWAM. SEC. (2015),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/Ethical_Autonomy_Working_Paper_031315.pdf?m
time=20160906082316; Rebecca Crootof, A Meaningful Floor for “Meaningful Human Control,” 30
TEMPLE INT’L&COMP. L.J. 53 (2016).
159 DINSTEIN, supra note 23, at 204-05.
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less than human life. AWS will not make war “bloodless.”160 But conditioning
their actions on the probability of bloodletting—on both sides—may make war
marginally more humane and less likely to spiral out of control.
B. AWS and Command-and-Control
An AWS cut off from its C2 network is more likely to use force illegally
or to fail to use force when it would be legal and strategically desirable to do so.
Notably, as discussed in Section II.D, an AWS cut off from its human
commanders might fire in an illegal and escalatory fashion if it were under the
mistaken belief that hostilities were ongoing. 161 Two safeguards may ameliorate
this risk. First, States developing AWS should endeavor to establish a “jus ad
bellum switch” in AWS, triggered by resilient communications systems. Second,
States may consider installing a time-delayed “auto-off” function in situations
where C2 is completely degraded.
First, to prevent AWS using force under the mistaken assumption that
hostilities are ongoing, militaries developing AWS should include a “jus ad
bellum switch,” which can be triggered by highly resilient communications
systems. As Paul Scharre notes, “[c]ommunications in contested areas is not an
all-or-nothing proposition.”162 Militaries may be able to maintain minimal
contact with AWS in denied environments, insufficient to directly control163
AWS but potentially enough to let an AWS know whether a broader state of
hostilities exists.164 Such a capability would minimize the risk that an AWS
mistakenly uses force in violation of international law. This system would also
function as a two-way street; an AWS in a communications-limited environment
could also let its broader command structure know whether an adversary has
launched an “armed attack,” triggering a right to self-defense.
Imagine that amid a conventional conflict in the South China Sea, State
X’s satellites have been destroyed. State X relies heavily on its satellites to
control its unmanned submersibles, which have an autonomous feature. But
using a backup communication system of Very Low Frequency (VLF) radio
transmissions, which have extremely limited bandwidth, State X can maintain a
rudimentary uplink with its unmanned subs scattered across the Pacific. State X
160 SCHARRE, ARMY OFNONE, supra note 7, at 303 (2018).
161 This is a jus ad bellum spin on Roff’s “Strategic Robot Problem.” See Roff, Lethal Autonomous
Weapons, supra note 16, at 211.
162 Paul Scharre, Centaur Warfighting: The False Choice of Humans vs. Automation, 30 TEMPLE INT’L
&COMP. L.J., 151, 161-64 (2016) [hereinafter Scharre, Centaur Warfighting].
163 Taking direct command of an AWS—that is, deactivating its autonomous mode—would likely
require substantially more bandwidth than allowing it to continue operating autonomously or ordering it
to hold its fire. For more on the AWS-bandwidth connection, see supra note 71 and accompanying text.
164 Scharre, Centaur Warfighting, supra note 162.
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could use this system to inform its subs whether a state of conflict is ongoing, in
which case the subs’ pre-existing programming for compliance with jus in bello
controls, or whether the conflict has ceased, in which case the sub knows that it
can only fire in line with the Caroline standard. Concretely, an autonomous sub
that stumbles upon State Y’s destroyer under the former condition could launch
a torpedo; but under the latter scenario, the submarine could only fire if the
destroyer posed a sufficiently immediate threat.
Second, in completely communications-denied environments, AWS
may need an “auto-off” switch. Such a feature—analogous to the timed
deactivation mechanisms on coffee pots or so-called “self-deactivating”
mines165—would switch an AWS from an aggressive to a defensive posture after
a set amount of time. Take the South China Sea hypothetical posed above, but
now assume that each side’s capacity to maintain communication with its
respective AWS has been completely eliminated. Before the destruction of its
command-and-control systems, State X activates an autonomous submersible in
a shipping lane to hunt and destroy State Z’s warships. Once a preset time—say,
72 hours—passes without a periodic confirmation from the submersible’s
commanding military that hostilities are ongoing, the submersible shifts back
into its pre-hostilities setting: on alert, but set not to fire except when permissible
under the Caroline standard. The submersible, in this setting, would not pursue
targets of opportunity. This feature would not guarantee total compliance with
the laws of war. But it would significantly minimize the risk of a “Battle of New
Orleans”166 or “Japanese holdout”167 violation.
Of course, both these approaches raise the risk that State X’s AWS
might be under-aggressive in a way that redounds to the strategic benefit of State
Z. But in neither instance is the risk unreasonable. First, the “jus ad bellum
switch” might be hacked.168 The task of preventing that from occurring is a
subset of the challenges of maintaining C2 integrity in contested environments;
and in any case, a military unable to ensure basic communications security is
unlikely to prevail in a conflict. Even for AWS that operate stealthily or behind
enemy lines, mitigating the hacking danger is conceptually different in degree,
165 Smart Weapons: Kill Switches and Safety Catches, ECONOMIST (Nov. 30, 2013),
https://www.economist.com/technology-quarterly/2013/11/30/kill-switches-and-safety-catches.html,
(discussing self-deactivating mines). See also DoDD 3000.09, supra note 20, at 2 (“[AWS shall] . . .
[c]omplete engagements in a timeframe consistent with commander and operator intentions and, if
unable to do so, terminate engagements or seek additional human operator input before continuing the
engagement.”).
166 See supra notes 66-80 and accompanying text.
167 Leys, supra note 41, at 58, 66.
168 See, e.g., Michal Klincewicz, Autonomous Weapon Systems, the Frame Problem and Computer
Security, 14 J. MIL. ETHICS 162 (2015) (arguing that the complexity of AWS makes hack-proofing
impossible).
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but not in kind, from the difficulty of transmitting nuclear launch codes to
submarines. Second, the auto-off function might cause an AWS to hold its fire
when using force would be legal and more strategically advantageous. But
failing to include this feature presents the reverse risk: that an AWS may fire
when it would be more advantageous to refrain from using force. The latter
danger may violate the laws of war; the former would not. The latter may prove
unnecessarily escalatory; the former would promote de-escalation. Moreover,
the strategic risks of an AWS entering “auto-off” mode can be mitigated by pre-
installing rules of engagement that, like the absorption rule proposed in Section
IV.A, allow the system to effectively defend itself.
C. The “Orange Box” Rule
An AWS that decides to fire in anticipatory self-defense should be
designed to preserve all data regarding its decision before firing. This rule would
reduce the chances of hacking or spoofing leading to an unintended conflict. I
refer to this as the “orange box” rule, named for the color and shape of the flight
recorders installed on aircraft.169 Recorders have proved crucial in understanding
how AI decisions have gone disastrously wrong in the past, most prominently in
analyzing plane crashes involving a malfunctioning autopilot.170 Unlike
commercial airliners, however, most AWS will function in highly networked
swarms or will be connected to military command-and-control systems. For that
reason, it should be relatively straightforward to transmit and back-up this data
in close to real-time, rather than storing it onboard an AWS.
To illustrate the “orange box” rule’s protection against spoofing, take
the Harpy example presented above.171 Under this rule, if a patrolling Harpy
detects an enemy radar and decides that it must strike to prevent a missile launch
against a civilian population, it should first transmit as much data as possible to
a friendly system for storage and analysis. An adjudicator after the fact would
then have access to the AWS’ observations and an audit of its internal decision-
making process.172 This information, in turn, would simplify the task of
169 Although these recorders are frequently referred to as a “black box,” this nickname is both visually
inaccurate and confuses the concept of the recorder, which is designed to enhance transparency, with the
concept of an impenetrable decision-making process, which by its nature is opaque.
170 See, e.g., Paul Schemm, Ethiopian Official: Black Box Data Show ‘Clear Similarities’ Between




171 See supra notes 9-12, 95-96 and accompanying text.
172 Some readers may worry that I am too cavalier in assuming the “explainability” of a given AI’s
decision-making process. There is a certain “assume a can opener” quality to proposals that turn on the
ability of AI to make itself comprehensible to humans. However, explainability (or “xAI”) is a priority
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determining whether a given strike objectively met the Caroline standard. In the
aftermath of the Harpy striking a civilian building, for instance, the adjudicator
could parse through the “orange box” data to determine if Hamas had placed a
targeting radar on top of the structure.
The “orange box” rule would also mitigate the risk of hacking, in at least
three ways. First, by preserving and transmitting the data received about a
hacking attempt, the rule would reduce the ability of an adversary to use a zero-
day exploit173 against multiple AWS. With more information regarding a
vulnerability, autonomous cyberdefenses will be better positioned to devise a
response.174 Second, even if an adversary manages to hack State X’s AWS so
that it transmits data falsely indicating that it is still under State X’s control,175
other nearby AWS could identify and destroy a compromised AWS by flagging
a difference between their observations of the hacked system and its transmitted
data. Third, the preservation and transmittal of data would assist a State whose
AWS were hacked to prove that it was not in control of an AWS that fired first,
and therefore did not violate jus ad bellum by starting a war.
V. CONCLUSION
Despite the risk of AWS starting a war, the dearth of literature regarding
autonomy, international crises, and jus ad bellum suggests that lawyers and
policymakers have not paid nearly enough attention to these questions. This Note
has argued that AWS may use force in anticipatory self-defense in at least some
circumstances.
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Furthermore, with the right rules in place, introducing AWS into crises
may improve compliance with jus ad bellum, reduce escalation, and save lives.
Militaries developing AWS should consider installing several technical
safeguards into their autonomous systems. First, AWS in swarming
configurations should be programmed to absorb the first blow in crisis situations,
except when doing so would present a threat to human life. Second, militaries
should endeavor to install a “jus ad bellum switch” in their AWS and
corresponding C2 structures. This system would ideally allow a military to
inform its AWS whether or not a state of hostilities exists, even in degraded C2
environments. Third, AWS should have an “auto-off” function. If, during a
period of hostilities, the AWS loses contact with its command structure for more
than a preset amount of time, the AWS will return to its pre-hostilities setting:
permitted to fire when allowed under the Caroline standard, but not to engage
targets of opportunity. Fourth, AWS should be subject to an “orange box” rule:
these systems should be required to store and transmit as much data as possible
regarding its decision to strike in anticipatory self-defense.
The development and introduction of AWS may be inevitable, but
humans retain decision-making power over one important set of rules: under
what circumstances may autonomous systems take us to war? Even if one
disagrees with the analysis and proposed rules presented here, that inquiry
deserves an answer. We cannot afford AWS that shoot first and ask these
questions later.
